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I recently completed a brief refresher course in Vipassana meditation after some 
personal setbacks disrupted my fledgling practice and accompanying equanimity. It 
was much needed.  My mojo is back, and I know more definitively than ever that the 
key to my personal happiness is daily meditation.  The reason why this is so important 
is that (as I said previously) Vipassana meditation is to the mind what physical 
exercise is to the body: it is necessary for good health.  It is actually more vital than 
physical exercise insofar as the body can be exercised while the mind is on autopilot, 
whereas meditation requires the vigilant awareness of the intertwining of mind and 
body. In other words, it is possible to have a healthy body while possessing a diseased 
mind (e.g. “meatheads”) whereas a healthy mind will invariably lead to a healthier 
body.  This is not to say that a Vipassana meditator cannot suffer from cancer. But a 
meditator who has cancer will be in much better shape than a non-meditator who is 
similarly afflicted. The bottom line is that the mind and body are inextricably tied 
together, and a well-ordered soul is axiomatically (as philosophers East and West 
have recognized since ancient times) one in which the mind rules over the body. 
Before I develop the centrality of the body in mediating the mind's relation to the 
external world, I would like to tackle a topic that has baffled philosophers (both 
professional and amateur) since the dawn of history: the meaning of life.  Simply put, 
the meaning of life is to become the best person you can be. The key is how one 
defines “best.”  Hedonists and Epicureans insist that the best life is the most 
pleasurable one.  In my opinion (actually, not just in my opinion), this is patently 
wrong. We come closer to the truth with Aristotle's virtue ethics, which maintains that 
the good life is the happy life. Happiness is irreducible to pleasure. There is a rational 
component to happiness that excludes considering only animal pleasures. Actually, 
Aristotle himself insists that animal pleasures (eating, sex) do contribute to the happy 
life. This is where Buddhist ethics would somewhat diverge from Plato's greatest 
student. For a Buddhist, the happy life is the purely rational life. In this respect, 
Buddhists come closer to Plato than Aristotle does. However, whereas Plato insists 
that it is possible to divorce the soul from the body, Buddhists would say (in concert 
with Aristotle) that this is impossible—at least in this life. 
This is one of the major reasons why a Buddhist ethics also diverges from 
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic ethics. With some iconoclastic exceptions, the 
Abrahamic faiths tend to suggest that the body corrupts the purity of the soul. Judaism 
arguable esteems the body more than its daughter religions. Even so, like its 
daughters, Judaism establishes a fairly strict separation between the sacred realm of 
Yahweh and the profane world of human beings. In conjunction with this dualism, the 
Abrahamic faiths typically define the good life as one in accordance with the laws of 
God. So human goodness is defined by divine standards imposed externally. 
Buddhism, on the other hand, understands human goodness to be a function of 
 Dr. JOO HEUNG LEE, Associate Professor, Oakton Community College, Email:
JooHeungLee@yahoo.com.
54 JOO HEUNG LEE 
Journal of East-West Thought
behavior conducive to happiness and the minimization of suffering on our own terms. 
This is not to say that we exclusively define the nature of happiness. Rather, it is 
nature which dictates what we need to do to be happy. The Dhamma (or Dharma) is 
nothing else but this law of nature. 
The law of nature dictates that to live in this world is to be embodied. This is why 
we cannot pretend that we are purely rational agents immune to the exigencies of the 
body. In other words, this is why Kant is wrong. Kant argues that the commands of 
reason must be obeyed irrespective of the demands of sensibility. Thus, the moral law 
for Kant manifests itself in the form of an imperative. What the Buddha realized is 
that there is no such thing as a categorical imperative. All imperatives are 
hypothetical. The moral law only applies insofar as one wants to be happy. For Kant, 
happiness is a negligible consideration. Not so for the Buddha. Happiness IS the telos 
of human life (in concordance with Aristotle), and the Dhamma dictates that this can 
only be achieved through mastery of our animal impulses—not through a command 
of reason or even habitual practice, but through eradicating the roots of our egoism 
through the dispassionate observation of sensation. 
What the Buddha saw very clearly (in fact, this is the very meaning of the word 
“Vipassana”) is that the ego is the source of all of our misery. It blinds us to the fact 
of our interconnectedness with the world. This is why Nietzsche's “ethics” also falls 
short. Nietzsche insightfully recognized that Kant's categorical imperative “smells of 
cruelty.” He rejected any morality that imposed its demands externally (despite Kant's 
insistence that the moral law was a function of autonomy). However, Nietzsche's 
solution to the problem of morality was to celebrate the ego over against any 
(imaginary) transcendent commandments. Consequently, Nietzsche's philosophy 
comes across as pessimistic—despite his insistence that he was the great affirmer of 
life. He dooms himself to a miserable life of solitude on the mountaintop, alone in his 
certainty that only the individual matters. It is not an accident that Nietzsche is 
considered a forerunner of Existentialism. Similarly, despite his attempts to distance 
himself from his “teacher” Schopenhauer, he ultimately shares with the ultimate 
pessimist a very negative view of humanity as a whole. It is an interesting 
coincidence that the fundamental Buddhist concept of Anicca (impermanence) is 
pronounced as a rejection of Nietzsche (A-Nietzsche). 
Schopenhauer was one of the first Western philosophers who incorporated the 
insights of Buddhism into his thought. Specifically, Schopenhauer's description of the 
Will's indiscriminate urge TO BE mirrors the Buddhist concept of tanha, or thirst 
(typically translated as “desire”). According to Buddhism's Second Noble Truth, 
tanha is the root of all suffering. It is responsible for the development of separate 
individuals, all of whom greedily chase after their sustenance no matter the cost to 
everything else around them. However, Buddhism prescribes a remedy to the misery 
that inevitably results: the Noble 8-fold path. This is the path of liberation from the 
ego and its accompanying suffering. Schopenhauer similarly diagnoses moral evil to 
be a function of the ultimately illusory concept of the ego. For Schopenhauer, moral 
goodness is reducible to egolessness. Whereas he argues that this is a capability that 
individuals possess more or less innately, Buddhists insist that this is something any 
human being can cultivate through the practice of meditation. Therefore, whereas 
Schopenhauer throws up his hands in despair over the patently obvious fact that most 
of us are fundamentally selfish, Buddhists smile with the understanding that the 
appropriate attitude towards the ignorant is not contempt but compassion. 
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Arguably, the most compelling analysis of morality throughout history has been 
in terms of the Golden Rule: Do unto others, as you would have them do unto you. 
The reason the Golden Rule works so well is that most of us share similar desires. 
Based on this, the Utilitarian argument that the summum bonum is to maximize the 
collective happiness of the greatest number seems to make sense. Yet, the problem 
with the Golden Rule is that many of the things that give us happiness (i.e. pleasure) 
are quite mundane. How would one compare the pleasure that dozens of human 
beings may get from eating a good steak versus the pain the cow experienced while 
being butchered? Peter Singer, applying Utilitarian principles to Animal Ethics, 
argues that there is no comparison: human pleasure from eating animals is negligible 
compared to the pain of the animal being eaten. Proponents of human exceptionalism 
argue otherwise. From a Buddhist perspective, both sides miss the point. Pleasure 
should NEVER be a consideration when determining the morality of an action. The 
only factor that counts is suffering. Of course, occasionally there has to be a trade-off, 
and that is when Utilitarian considerations might apply. Nevertheless, by and large, 
the majority of situations that fall under the purview of Utilitarianism would not 
qualify (at least not for the same reasons) as applicable to Buddhist ethics. 
The Western philosopher who I believe comes closest to a Buddhist ethics is 
Henri Bergson. In his classic work The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 
Bergson articulates a more primordial ground for our noblest impulses than the 
imperative formulation of Kant and moralities based on traditional religion. In 
contrast to traditional moralities, which are concerned with maintaining the cohesion 
of the hive through an us-versus-them mentality, this higher morality embraces 
humanity as a whole—a universal love that Buddhists call metta (the Greek/Christian 
concept of agape is similar). Whereas traditional morality pushes from behind, this 
higher morality appeals from in front. Great moral visionaries have never compelled 
their adherents through force of any kind, as their charisma gained them followers just 
by the goodness that they radiated (Siddhatta Gotama, Jesus, Kong Fuzi, and Martin 
Luther King are some of the more prominent examples). Complementing Bergson's 
idea of a higher morality based on universal love with Schopenhauer's focus on the 
alleviation of suffering through egolessness, we have something close to a Buddhist 
ethics. The only thing missing is a practical road map to moral goodness, which for 
Buddhists is the Noble 8-fold path. 
The Noble 8-fold path can be subdivided into three categories: Sila or Morality 
(Right Speech, Right Actions, Right Livelihood); Samadhi or Mental 
Discipline/Meditation (Right Exercises, Right Mindfulness, Right Concentration); 
and Panna or (Experiential) Wisdom (Right View and Right Thoughts). What is 
distinctive about Buddhist ethics compared to its Western counterparts is the addition 
of meditation to the classic dialectic of theory (panna) and practice (sila). This is 
exactly why panna is not really “wisdom” in the traditional sense of theoria. It is 
actually more akin to the Aristotelian notion of phroenesis (practical wisdom). The 
key point is that a complete morality is not possible without mental discipline—it is 
not just a matter of training oneself through habit (as Aristotle maintains) but getting 
at the root of our impulses through intensive meditation. This is how we are capable 
of transcending our narrow individuality and/or allegiance to the group to which we 
belong towards an embrace of all living beings. 
The universal love (metta) aspired to by Buddhists is, needless to say, against our 
biological nature. We tend to care almost exclusively for the people and things in 
closest proximity to us. This is, in fact, the presentiment behind Carol Gilligan's 
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Ethics of Care. Gilligan rejects Kant's abstract formalism based on reason in favor of 
concrete emotions. At this, a Buddhist would have no quarrel. Where they diverge is 
in Gilligan's preferential treatment for the relationships that mean the most to us. 
Buddhism, in contrast, insists that our moral sensibilities should extend equally across 
all living things—not based on a categorical imperative but on a universal love akin to 
that described by Bergson. Again, this is not something that comes easily. The 
difficulty of applying metta expansively is summed up in the famous mandate to love 
one's enemy. 
It is well known this is what Jesus asked us to do. But the radical nature of this 
injunction has typically been underappreciated. Just think of how impossible (almost 
offensive) it would seem to forgive and embrace the murderer of your child. This is 
exactly the message of the gospels. According to the Buddha, the only way to 
accomplish this almost impossible feat (at least for the vast majority of us) is through 
the practice of meditation. In contrast to Christians, who believe that faith is sufficient 
to acquire this kind of love, Buddhists insist it takes the hard work of mental 
discipline. Ironically, Nietzsche (the apotheosis of atheism) seems to understand the 
implications of the command to love one's enemies better than most Christians. 
Nietzsche at least understand that one must respect one's enemies before one can love 
them. However, with Nietzsche, it ends at respect—and at that; his respect is usually 
tinged with contempt from a sovereign height. Kant also remarks on the command to 
love one's enemy. The only way he can make sense of this is as a form of respect 
(practical love): he dismisses love based on sensibility as “pathological.” In contrast, 
this is exactly the kind of love that Buddhists aim to cultivate. In addition, unlike 
Aristotle (who limits this kind of friendship to virtuous men) and Gilligan (who 
focuses care on those who most matter), the Buddha insists that metta should extend 
across the whole spectrum of living beings. 
In everyday life, by and large, we choose who and what we care. Although we 
can care about a wide range of things, we care most about our fellow human beings. 
Kant understood this to be a function of our exclusive proprietorship of reason. Only 
a rational being can be found culpable for his or her actions. Those who we find 
utterly beneath us draw scant attention in terms of moral indignation: it is pointless to 
get angry at a dog for harming a child. Instead, we blame the adult human who ought 
to have been more responsible. Now if this adult were mentally impaired, this would 
also typically absolve him or her of responsibility (but in that case, they should not be 
in possession of a potentially dangerous animal). The point is that moral 
responsibility comes with the presupposition of rational agency (something Kant 
understood well). In addition, we tend to select as friends only those who we find 
worthy of esteem. 
In modern capitalist societies, wealth allows individuals to be ever more selective 
about the company we keep. The hoi polloi can be kept at a distance, except insofar as 
they are relegated well-defined positions of servility. Furthermore, wealth allows 
people to revel in their power, participating in what Nietzsche calls “the right of the 
masters.” So it is easy for the 1% to be gracious (even though so few of them are), as 
they are able to soar above the dialectical power games that structure human 
relationships. Still, unless one is utterly solitary (and Aristotle famously defined man 
as a political animal), other egos will always resist being reduced to mere objects in 
the solipsistic worlds of the affluent few. Moreover, even if you are one of the lucky 
ones blessed with riches, does that give you the right to use people as a mere means to 
your selfish ends? The obvious answer is “No!” As self-evident as this appears, using 
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individual were given the choice between the destruction of the world and the 
destruction of his/her self, there is little doubt how most of us would choose. This is 
because trapped in the prison of separate individual consciousnesses; the destruction 
of the self is equivalent to the destruction of the world. 
What Buddhists understand is that the idea of a separate individual consciousness 
is in fact what is illusory (despite Descartes' famous cogito). The apprehension of 
anatta (or non-self) follows from the experiential understanding of anicca 
(impermanence) that comes with meditation. The truth is that the separate self is an 
illusion, and we are all interconnected. However, this is a powerful illusion. It takes 
much hard work to dispel. Still, what more worthy endeavor is there in life? As 
Aristotle recognized, we are not born virtuous. We can become excellent human 
through practice—not just through habitual actions but also through the mental 
discipline that gets at the root of our underlying selfishness. The cultivation of 
saintliness (to use a historically loaded term) is accompanied by a genuine humility: if 
you see yourself as saintly, you are far from saintly. Humility is a function of the 
attenuation of the ego, which is equivalent to the development of moral goodness. 
Meditation enables one to generate love and compassion for all—even those whom 
others might designate as beneath them (it is not an accident that “inferior” human 
beings are often described as dogs). 
Ironically, the only effective way of dissolving the self is to withdraw into the 
self. There are many post-moderns (I used to be one of them) who argue that the self 
can be disrupted by the transgression of limits (e.g. Georges Bataille, Fight Club). 
Nevertheless, the conscious attempts to dismantle ego integrity becomes a project that 
ultimately reestablishes the preeminence of the ego: one reasserts control over the 
situation (Bataille recognized this in the Marquis de Sade but failed to see that his 
own attempts fell into the same trap). Vipassana meditation, in contrast, does not aim 
at dissolving the self: the realization of anatta comes as a by-product of the 
experiential awareness of the impermanence of our sensations. Which finally brings 
us back to the topic of the body. 
The individual interacts with the world through what Buddhists (along with 
Aldous Huxley and Jim Morrison) would call the six sense doors: vision, hearing, 
smell, taste, touch, and mind. The sense door of mind is typically omitted in Western 
catalogs, which says something about how the West divorces the mind from the body. 
Buddhists, in contrast, recognize that they are inseparable. Regardless, the mind, like 
most of the other senses, presupposes a space between consciousness and the object 
of perception: the visual object is external to the perceiver, sound must travel as 
waves to the eardrum, the mental object (or cogitatum) is not identical to 
consciousness or cogito (even though it depends on it). Smell and taste are somewhat 
different (which explains Proust's predilection for these senses), but they depend on a 
chemical incorporation of the external stimuli that is also predicated on a divide 
between subject and object. Only touch is unmediated. Touch requires direct contact 
between subject and object that attests to a continuity of Being. During meditation, all 
the other senses are quieted: your eyes are closed, it is silent, you are not eating, 
strong perfumes are discouraged (despite the incongruous employment of incense by 
some), and the mind is calmed by focus on the breath. In this way, one can become 
acutely mindful of the sensation of touch. Normally, we are so distracted by the other 
senses that we overlook the variegated activities of our bodies at the cellular level. 
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Life is motion. While sitting silently, one becomes aware of how every cell of the 
body is responding to the contact between mind and matter. In this way, we realize 
that we are interconnected to all that is. 
Socrates famously proclaimed that all evil was a result of ignorance. Socrates 
was right. What we are ignorant of is our interconnectedness to Being. Vipassana 
meditation dispels this ignorance (or moha). Without the normal filters in place to 
mediate our relationship to the world, we become vulnerable. We feel the pain of 
others as if it were our own—because it is. We can no longer pretend that we are 
invulnerable in our fortresses of solitude, outside of space and time in the realm of 
things-in-themselves, because to be embodied is to exist in space and time. The 
awareness of sensation during meditation (and extending outside it to “the real 
world”) reminds us that everything is constantly in flux—including our “selves.” The 
illusory sense of self comes from the five aggregates (skandhas): body, sensations, 
perceptions, consciousness, and mental habit patterns (sankharas). These heaps 
perpetuate the illusion of separate existence. However, they can be overcome through 
mental discipline. Heraclitus famously said that you cannot step into the same river 
twice (he was the one philosopher from the past that Nietzsche unequivocally 
admired). It is not only the river that is constantly in flux. You cannot step into the 
same river twice because neither the river nor “you” are identical moment to moment. 
Once you come to realize this, you are able to liberate yourself from the prison of the 
ego, and you are well on your way towards the happiness that comes with the 
experiential understanding of your interconnectedness to all that is. 
